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JULY-AUGUST, 1958
OIL AND GAS AS MINERALS WITHIN A GRANT
OR RESERVATION
By EDWARD S. BARLOCK
Edward S. Barlock received his B.S. in
Law from the University of Denver Col-
lege of Law in 1957. He is a senior in
the College of Law and is Editor in
Chief of DICTA. This note was awarded
first prize in a writing competition at the
law school sponsored by the Rocky
Mounfain Mineral Law Foundation.
For many years a continuing source of oil and gas litigation has
been a deed, usually an old one, containing a grant or reservation of
"minerals," but not mentioning oil and gas, alt-iough often enumerat-
ing one or more other specific minerals. Such a deed ordinarily gives rise
to no controversy until oil or gas is discovered, and in most cases this
does not happen until many years have elapsed since the original con-
veyance containing the grant or reservation was made. If the landowner
had expressly granted oil and gas or if he had expressly reserved oil and
gas from the conveyance of his land, the subject matter of the grant or
reservation could not be questioned. But where, as in the cases we are
going to consider, the grantor has used the term "minerals" and has not
used the words "oil and gas," it at once becomes a question as to whether
oil and gas are included within the grant or reservation.2
NATURE OF THE LANDOWNER'S INTEREST
Various interests may be disposed of by the owner of a fee simple
in mineral lands. He has all of the rights recognized by the law in both
the surface and in the minerals. He may, if he wishes, transfer all of his
rights in the entire premises, or he may sever all or a part of the minerals
or his rights therein from the remainder of his estate.' He can carve out
various interests either by granting his general estate with an exception or
reservation of mineral rights, or by granting the minerals, or the
I IA Summers, 041 And Gas § 135, p. 263 (Perm ed. 1954).
Ibid.
3 Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co. 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934)
(grantor's severance of mineral rights held binding upon his subsequent grantee of
land); Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943) (grantor's conveyance in or-
dinary form of deed containing no exception or reservation passed title to the grantee
and such title included all minerals).
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Carseloway, 45 i.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1930); Adams V.
Riddle, 233 Ala. 96, 170 So. 343 (1946).
5 Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934).
DICTA
JULY-AuLGUST, 1958
surface alone.' He can sell all, a segregated part, or an undivided
interest in the minerals.7 And, of course, his grants can extend to dif-
ferent kinds of minerals, or to different strata of minerals, so that there
can be as many owners as-there are kinds and strata of minerals. Be-
cause such control over the type and extent of the interest conveyed is
possible, the intent with which a particular conveyance is made will
extend or limit the interest conveyed or reserved depending upon the
language employed and the pertinent facts and circumstances.
DEFINITION OF THE WORD MINERAL
W\hen the general term "mineral" is used in a grant or reservation,
its meaning must necessarily depend upon the intent with which it is
used.' In a strict sense the words "oil and gas" are not included within
the meaning of the word "mineral" because oil and gas are classed scien-
tifically as hydrocarbon compounds." But in Sellars v. Ohio Valley
Trust Co.," the court asserted that the term "minerals" included oil and
,gas. even though in a strict sense oil and gas were properly classed as
,hydrocarbon compounds." To apply the term "minerals" in its narrow
signification to a grant of land containing an exception or reservation
,of minerals might prove absurd, because in a broad sense oil and gas
must logically be termed minerals since they are neither aninal nor
vegetable."
Some courts prefer to define oil and gas as minerals on the ground
that the term includes every inorganic substance extracted from the
earth for profit." A number of other authorities adopt the definition
that a mineral is any natural substance having sufficient value to be
6 "The owner of the entire estate in land may convey the minerals therein
separately from the surface. C-rov rsely, he may convey the surface separately from
the minerals." Harris v. Curr e, 42 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 304 (1943).
Sullivan, Oil And Gas. p. 2C4 (1955).
O Delaware & HL Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 38 AtI. 568 (1897).
United States ex rel and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Harris, 115
F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1940) (the meaning of the term minerals is to be determined
from the language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the
intention of the grantor).
10 Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.-,T. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
11248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. App. 1952).
12 "Strictly speaking, oil and gas are not minerals, but hydrocarbon compounds.
However, in a broad sense they may be and are termed minerals. So when the word
"minerals" is used without qualifications, it is construed as covering all organic and
inorganic substances that can be taken from the earth." Id. at 899.
13 Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 Atl. 832 (1906).
14 Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.. 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934);
McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S. W. 314 (1909);
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nined, quarried or extracted for its own sake or for its own specific
use.1" Under these broad definitions the term "minerals" has been held
to include oil and gas in a long line of decisions.1 " These decisions have
set a common standard of meaning for the term, and the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that a conveyance or reservation of "minerals"
includes oil and gas, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention




The question as to whether oil and gas has been included in a grant
or reservation of "minerals" has been litigated in the Kentucky courts
many times.'" In the decisions reported from that jurisdiction the view
taken with respect to the question under consideration is certainly rep-
resentative of the majority position, ° and an analysis of the Kentucky
cases affords an understanding of the basic distinctions between cases
following the majority view and cases purporting to do so and vet holding
that oil, gas, or both, are not included within a particular grant or reser-
vation of "minerals."
In Scott v. Laws, 0 under what was labeled the majority rule, it was
held that a conveyance of' "all the mineral right, and coal privileges and
rights of way to and from said minerals and coal privileges, also the right
to search for all undiscovered minerals and coals,''
1 1 included all inor-
ganic substances which were capable of being taken from the land, and
that to restrict the meaning of the term "minerals" there must be some
qualifying words or language indicating that the parties did not intend
such a broad meaning. " " The instant case was distinguished from the
case of McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,
" in which
it was held that gas did not pass by a conveyance which contained the
clause "all minerals such as coal, iron, silver, gold, col)per, lead, bismuth,
antimony, zinc or any other ra incral of any marketable value.""
Is the distinction drawn between the Scott and McKinney cases
sound? The ground upon which the distinction was made was that in
ilcKinney the words "any other material of any marketable value" were
to be read in connection with the minerals previously enumerated and
were confined to minerals of the same character.2
" Apparently the enumer-
ated minerals were considered to be of a character different from gas.
- Murray v. Allred. 100 Tenn. 100. 43 S.W
. 
355 (1)897).
161Brown v. Spilman. 15., U.S. 665 (1895): Lovelace v. Southwestern Petroleum Co.,
267 Fed. 513 (6th Cir. 1920); Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.. 72 F.2d
969 (4th Cir. 1934): Oshorn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.V. 122
(1912); Missouri Pac. RH. Co. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941);
Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard, 28 Cal. App. 2d 333. 82 P.2d 516 (1938) (holding that
while oil and gas are minerals their production is not mining): West Virginia Gas
Co. v. Preece. 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W,.2nd 163 (1935); Calhoun v. Ardis. 144 La. 3.11, 80 So.
548 (1918:) Wagner v. Mlallorv, 169 N.Y. 501, N.E. 564 (1902); Norman v. Lewis, 100
W. Va. 429. 130 S.E. 913 (1925).
17 See cases collected in IA Summers, Oil And Gas § 135, p. 271 (Perm ed. 1954).
's See Kentucky cases collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R. 2d 1440 (1955).
19 See cases collected in IA Summers, Oil And Gas § 135, p. 269 (Perm ed. 1954).
1o 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919).
2- 215 S. . at 51.
215 SAW. at 82.
23 134 Ky. 239 120 S.W\. 314 (1909).
2 120 SWv. 314 (emphasis supplied).





In the Scott case the only mineral expressly mentioned was coal and
the court held that "all mineral right" included oil and gas.
The decision in McKinney has not been considered to be a departure
from the majority view, with the exception that Pennsylvania claims that
it represents the minority view."' Thus, in Lovelace v. Southwestern
Petroleum Co., 2' a federal court discussed the McKinney case2 ' and said
that it plainly was not opposed to the general rule.2 ' The federal court
also indicated that McKinney was construed as being in the ejusdem
generis class.
Perhaps the distinction drawn by the Kentucky cases is best under-
stood in the light of the following language used in the McKinney case.
"It will be observed that gas is not specifically mentioned
in either of the deeds, but in all of them the word 'minerals' is
used, which counsel for the parties concede, when given its
broadest meaning, includes natural gas. But the question to be
determined is: What was the intention of the parties to the
deeds at the time they were made?."
The holding was, no doubt, based partly on the opinion that the
long list of enumerated minerals evidenced an intention not to include
gas, because it would appear to be common sense that if it were the in-
tention of the parties to include gas, they would have added it to the
list of enumerated minerals. This position was no doubt strengthened
by the fact that the easements accompanying the grant were inappli-
cable to the production of oil or gas.
Another Kentucky case which is worthy of mention is Lambert
v. Prichett," ' a 1955 case, where the controversy was over the scope of a
reservation in a certain deed to the effect that "no coal or mining rights
are hereby conveyed." It was held that the words "mining rights" fol-
lowing a reference to coal must be considered as having been used in
their ordinary sense and related to the specific mineral mentioned. But
in Murray v. Allred, "- where the common predecessor in title of both
the defendant and the complainant conveyed to the defendant's remote
grantor the land in question, reserving "all mines, minerals, and metals
in and under the land," it was held that the reservation included oil.
The court pointed out that the true meaning of the word "mineral" in-
cluded oil and gas and was to be determined from dictionaries and other
similar authorities. " The minority view, as enunciated in Dunham v.
Kirkpatrick,3 ' was disapproved in clear and emphatic language."
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Generally speaking, and with the exception of Pennsylvania, every
jurisdiction which has passed upon the problem of whether oil and gas
are included within an exception or grant of "minerals" has purported
to follow the rule that oil and gas are included, unless from the lan-
38-Preston v. South Penn Oil Co. 238 Pa. 301, 86 At. 203, 204 (1913).
27 2V7 Fed, 51 (6th ,ir, 1920).
-Id. at 517, 518.
Id at 518.
120 SA., at 317.
31 284 S.-W.2d 90 (Ky. 1955).
3 100 Ky. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897).
Id. at 117, 43 S W. at 359.
', 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
43 S.V. at 3.59.
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guage of the instrument, or from the surrounding circumstances at the
time it was executed, it is concluded that the term was used in a less
inclusive sense."" The cases commented upon in this section are examples
of this general rule.
Branham v. Miear" involved a determination by the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals of the meaning of a reservation of "any minerals on
said land." The court made the observation that the cases seemed con-
clusive and that the reservation in the deed in question undoubtedly
meant all minerals, including oil and gas. The question was deemed
to be so well settled that the court found it unnecessary to cite any
authorities."
It was held, in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.,"3 that a con-
veyance of "all the coal and minerals of every description" embraced oil
and gas. The rule laid down was that under normal circumstances a con-
veyance or exception of minerals will include natural gas in place and
oil, in the absence of proof of a contrary intent.'"
THE PENNSYLVANIA VIEW
An early Pennsylvania case, Dunham v. Kirkpatrick," held that a
reservation of' "all timber suitable for sawing, also all minerals" (lid not
include oil and gas. The court recognized that oil was considered to be
a mineral, in a broad sense of the term' 2 but reasoned that in popular
estimation it was not so regarded, and that the parties must have in-
tended to use the term mineral in a sense based upon the ideas of every-
day life." Perhaps the holding in the case is not too far out of line with
the majority view, but the reasons advanced by the court to sustain
its position were poorly stated and reflect the weakness of its position.
The particular language of the court from which the instant conclusion
is drawn is:
"They [the parties] were, doubtless, at that time un-
aware of the character of the property as oil territory. But if
they did entertain such an idea, and expected to reserve oil
Linder the general term 'mineral,' they were mistaken, and
should have known that they were using that word in a manner
not sanctioned by the common understanding of mankind,
hence, in a manner that could not be approved by the courts
of justice.""
Later Pennsylvania cases have adhered to this same view, but the
reasons given for the following Dunham are based partially on the
doctrine of stare decisis, as is indicated in the other cases which have
entrenched the minority view more deeply into the law of that juris-
diction.
Dunhan was followed in Silver v. Bush," where it was held that
a reservation of "the mineral underlying" the land conveyed did not in-
clude natural gas, and that the grantee tinder the deed was entitled to it.
30 See note 16 supra.
:17 199 S.NV.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
aS Id. at 845, 846.
3, 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936).
40 186 S.E. at 22.
41 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
12 Id. at 43.
4 I d. at 44.
44 Ibid.
45 213 Pa. 195, 62 AtI. 832 (1906).
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The court advanced the position that although such natural gas was a
mineral in the broadest sense of' the term, evidence was needed to estab-
lish that the parties intended to include gas within the reservation."
Since there was no evidence on that point in the record, the minority
rule was again applied. It was stated that the Dunham decision was
a part of the law of the state when the deed was executed and to some
extent at least had become a rule of property on which many titles in
western Pennsylvania depended."
And, following Dunham and Silver, the court held in Preston v.
South Penn. Oil Co.,"8 that a reservation of "all minerals and mining
rights and the incidents thereto," did not include oil and natural gas, in
the absence of a showing of an intent to include them. Again it was
pointed out that the rule in Dunham had become a rule of property and
would not be disturbed. " An additional comment was that the decisions
in other jurisdictions were not harmonious on the question before the
court, and that the Pennsylvania view had been followed in Detlor v.
Holland,; an 1898 Ohio case, and in McKinney v. Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co.," discussed earlier.
Once again in Bundy v. Ayers'" a 1953 decision, a reservation of
"oil, coal, fire clay, and minerals of every kind and character," was held
not to include natural gas. The court said that in Pennsylvania there
is a rebuttable presumption that when the word "mineral" is used in a
(teed, reservation or exception, it does not include oil or gas."5 The court
rejected the contention that gas should be included under the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, and pointed out that if gas had been intended to be
included, "then why was the oil expressly reserved?"".
Ohio is the only other jurisdiction that has relied on the Dunham
decision. In Detlor v. Holland," it was decided that a grant of "all the
coal of every variety, and all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable
minerals, in, on, or under" the land did not include oil and gas. The
decision was based upon what was called the correct rule of construction
and upon the authority of the Dunham case."
Although it might have been asserted that in Detlor the Ohio court
had followed the minority view, the question was settled in Jividen v.
New Pittsburgh Coal Co., 5' where it was held that oil and gas were in-
cluded within a reservation which read: "This deed is to convey the
surface only . . . [the grantors] reserve all coal and other minerals, with
the right to mine and haul the same ... ."" The Detlor case was distin-
guished and the court espoused the general rule that the term "minerals"
includes oil and gas, in the absence of a showing of a contrary intent."
46 62 At. at 833.
7 Ibid.
s 218 Pa. 301. 86 Atl. 203 (1913).
4" 86 Atl. at 204.
, .7 Ohio St. 492. 49 N.E. 690 (1898).
SSee note 21 supra.
372 Pa.. 533. 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
.8 94 A.2d at 725.
td. at 726.
S,5 o note 48 snupt.
49 N.E. 692, 693.
7 187 N.E. 124 (Ohio 1933).





There is no Colorado case which has decided the question whether
a grant or reservation of' "minerals" includes oil and gas. But in Far-
rell v. Sayer," the Colorado Supreme Court did decide that a reserva-
tion "excepting and reserving all minerals and all mineral rights and
rights to enter upon the surface of the land and extract the same" did not
include ordinary sand and gravel. The rule set out in the opinion was
that the word "minerals" when found in a reservation means substances
exceptional in use, value and character, and does not include the ordi-
nary soil found on the land and common to the area where the land is
situate."
Although the Farrell case did not involve oil and gas, the opinion
does indicate that the court considered substances exceptional in use,
Value and character to come within the purview of the term "minerals,"
when used in a grant or reservation. The interesting question presented
is, thereftore, whether oil and gas are substances falling under the court's
definition. They appear to fit the requirements laid down by the court.
The question will be of considerable interest to oil and gas lawyers
when the time arrives f'or the Colorado view to be enunciated. That time
is not far away, for there is presently before the Colorado Supreme Court
an action involving a claim to oil and gas arising out of a deed contain-
ing a reservation of' "the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other
minerals."'
PARTICULAR LANGUAGE AND CIRCUNI STANCES
A substantial number of cases involving the question we have been
considering have been decided under the rule that intention controls."
Consequently, it is ilmportant to understand the rule that: when f'om the
language of the instrument, or fron the facts and circumstances at the
time of its execution, it appears that the parties did not have oil and gas
in mind, a grant or reservation of1 minerals will not include oil and gas. "
If the cases which seem to have departed from the general rule are viewed
in relation to this principle they may be entirely consistent.
The case of Moron Coal Co. v. Riggs"5 is an example of a situation
in which the courts will apply the principle that intention governs. In
this case the Indiana court recognizecd the rule that oil and gas are
included within a1 reservation of' minerals, in the absence of a contrary
intention. However, it held that a deed of' "all the coal, fire clay and
minerals underlying the surface' of' the land in question was ambiguous
and required the introduction of' parol evidence. From the evidence
so let in the court determined that the patties had not intended to include
oil and gas.
But in Shell Oil Co. v. Moore,"6 a deed of "the surface only" of the
land in question, reserving to the grantor the right to mine and remove
"all the coal and other minerals underlying said land," was held to re-
serve to the grantor the ownership of' the oil and gas, the right to explore
for it, and the right to use the surface to obtain it. The court observed
611129 Colo. 36S, 270 f'.2d 190 (1954).
'1 Id. at 373, 270 P.2d at 192.
112 Radke v. Union Pacific R., No. 18254.
,IA Summers, Oil And Gas § 135. p. 278 (ljerin ed. 1954).
- Ibid.
115 Ind. App. 236. 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944).
0382 111. 556, 4S N.E.2d 400 (1943).
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that it regarded oil and gas as minerals, and that rule, coupled with the
fact that only the surface was included within the grant, led the court
to the conclusion that the mineral estate and the right to explore for
oil and gas were left in the grantor.
Riggs and Moore do not represent inconsistent viewpoints. Quite
the contrary, they represent the rule that the intent of the parties indi-
cated from the language of the instrument and from the surrounding
facts and circumstances will control.
Where the language in a grant or reservation is unusual, the cases
indicate that a fine line is drawn. No general standard is controlling,
and common sense seems to be the best guide. Thus, it has been held
that the language "excluding all the mineral on said land, excluding all
the timber that belongs to [a former grantor]" is ambiguous,7 and
evidence is admissible to show that oil and gas were not intended.
In other difficult cases, it has been held that an exception of "min-
eral deposits" includes oil and gas," against the objection that although
oil and gas may be minerals they are not "deposits"; that a reservation
of "coal, mineral, stone, or any other mineral deposits" includes oil and
67 Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 Fed. 32 (6th Cir. 1924).





as thy purse can buy, but not
express'd in fancy; rich, not gaudy;
for the apparel oft proclaims the man.'
OrEx e -William Shakespeare
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gas; " that a grant of "coal and mining rights" does not convey oil and
gas. 0
In some cases either the word oil or the word gas, but not both, are
specifically mentioned together with the term minerals. \Vhen such a case
arises it is usually contended that the inclusion of one results in the ex-
clusion of the other. On this point the cases are in hopeless conflict.
It has been held that the word "mineral" in an exception of "min-
eral and timber and oil" includes natural gas, where there is nothing
to show a contrary intention."1 Another case held that a reservation of"all minerals, mineral substances and oil of every sort and description"
included natural gas." But a reservation of "all oil privileges" has been
held not to include natural gas. ' '
AP'LICATION OF TiHl RUIE or EJusDIEM GENE RIS
In addition to the problem arising out of a situation where either oil
or gas is specifically mentioned to the exclusion of the other, the enumer-
ation of one or more specific minerals in conjunction with the general
term "minerals," presents a problem of construction. Sometimes the
courts consider the enulmeration to be indicative of an intent to omit
oil and gas, or of an ambiguity. This frequently leads to the specific
question of the applicability of the doctrine of ejusdem generis."
A reservation of "the exclusive right to the iron, coal and other min-
erals" was held not to include oil and gas in a 1922 Louisiana decision.-,-
In reaching the decision the court applied the rule of ejusdem generis
and pointed out that the words "other minerals" following the specific
terms "coal and iron" were to be construed as including minerals of a
character similar to coal and iron, such as solids or ninerals in place.
In contrast with the Louisiana case just mentioned, the case of
Shell Oil Co. v. Dyel held that oil and gas were included in a convey-
ance of "all the coal and ether minerals in, on and under" the land.
The court refused to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis and took the
position that the naming of one specific mineral, namely coal, was not
an enumeration. The court also mentioned that coal and oil had some
common characteristics, since they were both used for fuel and were,
from a technical viewpoint, both hydrocarbons.
An interesting observation was made in Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co.
v. Moore,-, where the court stated that it was within the common knowl-
edge of mankind that oil is usually found in salt water and that, there-
fore, a conveyance of "all the coal, saltwater and minerals" included oil
and gas."0 The doctrine of ejusdem generis did not operate to exclude
oil and gas, and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible.
09 Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. MeEntire. 128 Tex. 124. 95 S.V.2d 381 (1936).
70 Easley v. Melton. 262 S.AV.2d 686 (Ky. 1953).
71 252 Ky. 17, 66 S.AV.2d 19 (1933).
-2Dingess v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 271 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1921).
I' Murphy v. Vanvoorhis, 94 \v. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923).
74 "In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, the 'ejusdem generis
rule' is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be con-
strued in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." Black, Law Dictionary
(4th ed. 1951).75 Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Land Co.. 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922).
76 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943).
77 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.J.2d 46 (1942).
Is 161 S.W.2d at 48.
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A deed to a railroad of a right-of-way 'together with the right to
take and use all the timber, earth, stone and mineral" was held not to
convey the oil under the land.'" The ground on which the court based
its decision was that the interest granted was the right-of-way and the
facilities necessary to the efficient use of that right, and that under the
rule of ejusdem generis, the word "mineral" should lie applied to the
same class of substance as the particular words indicated.
Similarly, a reservation of "all the minerals, coals, together with all
the necessary rights of way" was held not to exclude oil and gas when
read in connection with the provision "to mine, excavate, and transport
the same.""' The court concluded that the deed, when read as a whole,
and the word "coals" immediately following the term 'minerals," inci-
cated an intention on the part of the grantor to limit or restrict the mean-
ing of the more comprehensive term "minerals," and that the only
nineral actually reserved was coal.
The cases which have been placed in the ejusdem generis class might
seem inconsistent if the language employed in the instruments of convey-
ance is alone considered, but they may appear quite consistent when
analyzed from the viewpoint that intention is a factor of major impor-
tance. This is indicated in the last-mentioned case, where the court ob-
served that both intent and the specific language of the instriument were
to be considered.
CONCILUSION
The question whether oil and gas are included in a grant or reserva-.
tion of "minerals" has been litigated many times. The continuing dis-
covery of oil on newly explored lands affords ample background for this
type of litigation and the courts are constantly being called upon to de-
cide the question. An over-all survey of the cases indicates that there is
a great deal of consistency among the decisions. The Pennsylvania view
has not gained a following, and the courts are practically unanimous in
holding that oil and gas are included in a grant or reservation of "min-
eraIs," unless it appears from the language of the deed, or from the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of its execution, that oil and gas
were not intended to be included. The apparent inconsistency in some
of the decisions is best explained in light of the cardinal principle that
intention governs.
106 Tex. 94. 157 S.\V. 737 (1913).
Horse Creek Latnd & Mining Co. v. lidkiff. 81 AV. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
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